The S i g n i f i c a n c e and Or i g i n s of the DDF M e m o r a n d u m
The o n c e -s e c r e t CIA d o cument p u b l i s h e d for the first time bel o w has m u l t i p l e s i g n i f i c a n c e for scholars of A m e r i c a n -I n d o n e s i a n relations in the cold wa r p e r i o d . * 1 First and foremost, this long m e m o r a n d u m offers a rare o p p o r t u n i t y to gauge the substance and q u a l i t y of po l i c y analysis in the CIA*s D e p u t y D i r e c t o r a t e for Plans (henceforth D D P ) , wh o s e Far East D i v i s i o n u n d e r D e s m o n d F i t z g e r a l d 2 p r e p a r e d it at the order of DDP D i r e c t o r R i c h a r d Bissell in m i d -M a r c h 1 9 6 1 . 3 * N o r m a l l y DDP does not p r o d u c e p apers w h i c h can be c h a r a c t e r i z e d as a mi x t u r e of i n t e l l i g e n c e e s t i m a t e and p oli c y implications, as Bissell describes the c ontents of the rep o r t in his cover memo.
The D D P 's formal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y w i t h i n the CIA is e x c l u s i v e l y for C l a n d e s t i n e s e r v i c e s 1 1 of three m a i n types: i n t e l l i g ence collection, c o u n t e r i n t e l l i g e n c e and covert actions, invol v i n g a who l e range of operations (or Mdirty 3It is Bissell1s personal recollection that Fitzgerald probably authored the DDP Indonesia paper. Interview with Richard Bissell, November 1973. In January 1961 Fitzgerald had the opportunity to study the Indonesian situation at first hand. During a visit to Jakarta he conferred not only with his Chief of Station, Vernet Gresham, but his policy antagonist Ambassador Jones. "Ambassador Jones* 1961 Appointment Book,1 1 Box 3, Jones Papers.
(These recently opened papers of the late Ambassador are deposited in the Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University.) 131 tricks") from p l a c i n g a rticles in fo r e i g n n e w s p a p e r s to a s s a s s i n a t i n g fo r e i g n p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s .^ It is thus not the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the DDP to p r e p a r e i n t e l l i g e n c e estimates, a job w h i c h is a s s i g n e d to the other side of the C IA structure, the D e p u t y D i r e c t o r a t e for I n t e l l i gence (henceforth DDI).
W o r k i n g in part from the raw dat a r e p o r t e d by the DDP, but m a i n l y (ca. 80 percent) from open sources, it is the DDI that p r e p a r e s the several types of finished i n t e l l i g e n c e pr o d u c t s that are d e s i g n e d to serve the p o l i c y maker.
Not only is i n t e l l i g e n c e a n a l ysis ou t s i d e the D D P 's jurisdiction, but the m a k i n g of p o l i c y r e c o m m e n d ations is f o r m a l l y e x c l u d e d from the functions of b o t h DDI and DDP. This DDP m e m o r a n d u m is t h e r e fore s i g n i f i c a n t not m e r e l y be c a u s e it is a o n c e -s e c r e t CIA document, but be c a u s e it is a p o l i c y m e m o r a n d u m a u t h o r e d by the DDP.
The s i g n i f i c a n c e of this DDP p a per derives also from the critical p e r i o d in A m e r i c a n -I n d o n e s i a n r e l ations during w h i c h it was produced. For the early m o n t h s of 1961 saw m a j o r changes d e v e l o p i n g in both the i n t e r n a t i o n a l set t i n g and the dome s t i c politics of b o t h countries.
In the larger i n t e r n a t i onal system, the advent of the Kennedy a
d m i n i s t r a t i o n m a r k e d b o t h a global i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of the cold war and a new e m p hasis on the T h i r d W o r l d as a cold w ar b a t t l e g r o u n d . 5 This i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n was i m m e d i a t e l y apparent in the rapid esca l a t i o n of S o v i e t -A m e r i c a n c o m p e t i t i o n for influence over the h i g h l y strategic and r e s o u r c e -r i c h n o n a l i g n e d state of Indonesia.
M e a n w h i l e , in J a k a r t a Pres i d e n t Sukarno was p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h c o n s o l i d a t i n g the p o l i t i c a l and i n s titutional arr a n g e m e n t s of the h i g h l y p e r s o n a l i z e d a u t h o r i t a r i a n p o l i tical system of Guided Democracy, w h i c h he had p r o c l a i m e d w i t h army support in July 1 9 5 9 . 6 C oncurrently, in the sphere of f o r e i g n p o l i c y Sukarno had elev a t e d his c a m p a i g n for the l i b e r a t i o n of West Irian--t h e last remnant of the former D utch East I n d ies--to top p r i o r i t y . 7 B r eaking d i p l o m a t i c rela t i o n s w i t h the Dutch **For brief, but highly reliable discussions of the inner structure of the CIA in the early 1960s, see Church Committee, Report on Assassination Plots, pp. 1-12. Also see U.S., Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, hearings on Covert Action, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975. Also see Agee, Inside the Company, especially pp. 39-45 and the appen dix, which has three charts showing the evolution of the basic organization of the CIA. For the most authenticated overview of the CIA!s organizational history, see U.S., Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Re spect to Intelligence Activities, , "History of the Central Intelligence Agency," in Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., 1976, pp. 1-108 (henceforth Church Committee, History of the CIA).
5For a scholarly, moderately revisionist history of the cold war paying close attention to both Soviet and American policy, see Walter LaFeber, America, Russia and the Cold War, 1945 -1972 , 2nd ed. (New York: Wiley, 1972 ).
6Although there is as yet no comprehensive scholarly political history of the Guided Democracy period , informed overviews appear in J. D. Legge, Sukarno: A Political Biography (New York: Praeger, 1972) , and Bernhard Dahm, History of Indo nesia in the Twentieth Century (New York: Praeger, 1971 ). The most penetrating anal ysis of the politics of the early Guided Democracy years is still Herbert Feith's "Dynamics of Guided Democracy," in Ruth McVey (ed.), Indonesia (New Haven: HRAF Press, 1963), pp. 309-409. 7For a perceptive, but critical perspective on Sukarno's foreign policy from a in A u g u s t 1960 and c o l l e c t i n g his first ma j o r m i l i t a r y loan from the U S S R in J a n u a r y 1961, the I ndo n e s i a n p r e s i d e n t was bent on securing A m e r i c a n d i p l o m a t i c supp o r t as well for the rapid a c h i e v e m e n t of this objective. In W a s h i n g t o n , m e a n w h i l e , the e l e c t i o n of Joh n F. K e n n e d y had set in m o t i o n the s h u f f l i n g of p o l i c y m a k e r s and the r e v i e w i n g of p r i o r i ties and p o l i c i e s that n o r m a l l y m arks the tran s f e r of p ower from one p r e s i d e n t and his p a r t y to a n o t h e r . 8 H i g h on the K e n n e d y agenda was b r i n g i n g ne w u r g e n c y and e m pathy to U.S. r e lations w i t h the Th i r d World, of w h i c h I n d o n e s i a was p e r c e i v e d as a major, if l argely unknown, l e a d e r . 9 G i v e n S u k a r n o 's bold c o n f r o n t a t i o n s t r a t e g y for liberating West Irian, it was clear that by at least the end of the year the young a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w o u l d face a c omplex and crucial test of these still u n c r y s t a l l i z e d policies. (New York: Harper and Row, 1967) . Two later memoirs are also useful because of their differing vantage points and interpretations. See W. W. Rostow's laudatory The Diffusion of Power, 1957 -1972 (New York: Macmillan, 1972 , and the disillusioned liberal Chester Bowles's critical Promises to Keep (New York: Harper and Row, 1971 Thanks to a m i d -F e b r u a r y d e c i s i o n by President S u karno to take up P r e s i d e n t K e n n e d y 's o p e n -d a t e d invi t a t i o n to visit. W a s h i n g t o n in late April, the A m e r i c a n g o v e r n m ent had to meet that test m u c h sooner than e x p e c t e d . 10
The s c h e d u l i n g of S u k a r n o 's visit thus had the effect of g a l v a n i z i n g the DDP and all other aspirant architects of K e n n e d y 's I n d o n e s i a p o l i c y into i n t e n s i f y i n g their c o m p e t i t i o n for influence. It was the o c c u r r e n c e of this c l e arly d e f ined te n -w e e k p e r i o d of p r e p a r a t i o n for S u k a r n o 's v i s i t that not only explains the timing of the D D P 's paper, but also adds another d i m e n s i o n to its s i g n i f i c a n c e for the scholar.
For the r e l a t i ve suddenness and the h i g h stakes involved in the Sukarno v i s i t m e a n t that the p r o d u c t i o n of c o m p a r a b l e d ocuments f r o m d i v e r g e n t agenc i e s and individuals was u n u s u a l l y heavy.
A threey e a r effort by the author and the h i g h l y c ompetent a r c hivists of the K e n n e d y Lib r a r y has led to the d e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of mo s t of these rich d o c u m e n t a r y s o u r c e s . 11
The e x t r a o r d i n a r y DDP p o l i c y m e m o r a n d u m thus takes on added s i g n i f i c a n c e p r e c i s e l y because it can be v i e w e d not in isolation, but along s i d e va rious c o n t e m p o r a r y m e m o r a n d a w i t h w h i c h it was c o n t e n d i n g for p r e s i d e n t i a l at t e n t i o n and approval.
A l t h o u g h the pol i t i c s of p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n in a n t i c i p a t i o n of S u k a r n o 's vi s i t i nvolved o r ganizations, groups, and individuals that w e r e outside as well as inside the U.S. government, the focus here will be on the p o l i t i c s of o r g a n i z a t i o n s and individuals (now p o p u l a r l y known as ''b u r e a u c r a t i c p o l i t i c s " ) w i t h i n the executive b r a n c h . 12
Involving 1 Indonesia, 1962 -1963 " (Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1969 , especially pp. 65-77. 11My forthcoming book on the politics of Indonesia policy formulation under Kennedy and Johnson attempts to integrate these documentary sources with extensive interview data and various secondary sources. Hopefully other scholars, both Indone sian and American, will also begin exploiting these documents. 12The ambiguous and misleading term "bureaucratic politics" is used here, more as a symbol than a rigorous category, to connote a broad approach geared to the highly political process by which foreign policy is formulated. This eclectic approach re sembles most closely the one employed in Hilsman's To Move a Nation, especially chap ters [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 35, 36; and Abraham Lowenthal, '''Liberal, ' 'Radical, ' and Laos since 1954 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972 .
There is thus no attempt here to apply rigorously either of the three models of the foreign-policy formulation process that Graham Allison developed in his The Essence of Decision (Boston: Little Brown, 1971) . A less rigorous but more fully illustrated presentation appears in Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and For eign Policy (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1974) . Finally, see the highly lucid and instructive, if admittedly still primitive, effort of a distinguished the m i d d l e -l e v e l b u r e a u c r a t i c echelons from the start, this politics e n g a g e d the h i g h e r -l e v e l p o l i c y m a k i n g circles (i.e., pe o p l e w i t h the rank of A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y and above) as early as m i d -F e b r u a r y 1961. W h i l e w i n n i n g only b r i e f a t t e n t i o n from a p r e sident p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h the e s c a l a t i n g crises in Laos, Vietnam, Cuba, and the C o n g o , 13 I n d o n e sia d i d c o m m a n d s u b s t a n t i a l interest in the w e e k l y m e e t i n g s of a more i n f ormal i n t e r a g e n c y p o l i c y -p l a n n i n g forum just b e l o w the National S e c u r i t y Council (NSC) in status.
This was known as the T u e s d a y lunch g r o u p 14 and its m e m b e r s h i p e m braced the senior officials of the four m o s t p o w e r f u l agencies in the f oreign p o l i c y -c u m -n a t i o n a l security c o m plex:
M c G e o r g e Bundy, the P r e s i d e n t 's Special A s s i s t a n t for National S e c u r i t y Affairs; W alt Rostow, the P r e s i d e n t 's D e p u t y Special As s i s t a n t for N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y Affairs; George McGhee, C o u n s e l o r of the State D e p a r t m e n t and C h a i r m a n of its Policy Planning Council; Paul Nitze, the A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y of D e f e n se for International S e c u r i t y A f f a i r s ( I S A ) ; R o b e r t Amory, D e p u t y D i r e c t o r of the CIA for Intell i g e n c e ( D D I ) ; and R i c h a r d Bissell, D e p u t y D i r e c t o r of the CIA for Plans ( D D P ) .
The fact that the DDP paper was p r e p a r e d at B i s sell*s initiative for this h i g h l y i n f l u e n t i a l T u e s d a y lunch group u n d e r l i n e s its real p o l i t i c a l importance.
For, u n like man y other m e m o r a n d a of the Sukarno v i s i t period, the DDP pa p e r not only r eached the desks of top p o l i c y m a k ers, but p r o b a b l y was a c tually d i s c u s s e d by t h e m . 15 diplomatic historian to integrate all three of the Allison models into "a synthetic model of governmental action": Ernest May, "The 'Bureaucratic Politics1 Approach: U.S. -Argentine Relations, 1942-1947," in Cotier and Fagan (eds.) , Latin America and the United States, pp. 129-63.
In employing even an eclectic bureaucratic politics approach here, I am acutely aware of its inherent limitations. Apart from the familiar dangers of seduction by "models" and their baggage of often murky jargon, the most serious risk is the im plicit embrace of more fundamental empirical and value assumptions about the locus and nature of power in both the American political system and in America's relations with the Third World. For a provocative, if fragmented, discussion of whether the bureaucratic politics approach constitutes a complement to or a substitute for "the radical perspective" (especially the models of the dependency school) and "the lib eral perspective," see the conflicting views outlined in "Some North American Per spectives," in ibid., pp. 129-37. For other related dangers see I. M. Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 65-72. 1interviews with officials concerned with Indonesia in all the major foreign policy agencies confirm the constant difficulties involved in competing with major crisis areas for the limited attention of the president and his staff. For a brief discussion of this "attention" problem, see Stevenson, End of Nowhere, 14As the membership suggests, this group was seen as a vehicle for long-range planning, as well as a forum for debating current sub-crisis-level problems. See Rostow, Diffusion of Power, p. 169.
15Given the high prestige still enjoyed by the CIA--and especially the DDP--in this pre-Bay of Bigs period, the likelihood of Bissell's colleagues reading and re acting to the DDP paper seems high. See Church Committee, History o f the CIA. Regrettably, however, the Kennedy archives yield only one memorandum reacting direct ly to the paper. Written by White House adviser Robert Komer, this particular docu ment has been denied declassification by the NSC. In that Komer came to his White House role after nearly a decade as an intelligence analyst in the DDI, his reaction to the DDP paper would be especially valuable for weighing intramural CIA factional Purposes of This C o m m e n t a r y
In o f f e r i n g a bri e f and t entative c o m m e n t a r y on this e x t r a o r d i n a r y DDP document, the first task is to sketch more fully the larger b u r e a u cratic p o l i t i c s 1 1 * * * * s e t ting of w h i c h the Tu e s d a y lunch group was only a small, albeit powerful, component.
A f t e r introd u c i n g the DDP's allies and a d v e r s a r i e s the c o m m e n t a r y turns d i r e c t l y to e x p l i c a t i o n of the actual m e a n i n g of the paper.
Here a bri e f survey of the D D P 's a s s e s s ment of I n d o n e s i a n p o l i t i c s (what B i s s e l l 's cover m e m o r a n d u m calls the i n t e l l i g e n c e e s t i m a t e " c o m p o n e n t of the paper) p r e c e d e s a more lengthy analysis of D D P 's p o l i c y r e commendations.
A t t e n t i o n is g iven b o t h to the D D P !s a p p r a i s a l of three br o a d a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i c y post u r e s and its stand on the im m e d i a t e p o l i c y issues that ranked at the top of the I n d o n e s i a n -A m e r i c a n a g e n d a in early 1961, namely, the e s c a l a t i n g Dutch-I n d o n e s i a n d i s p u t e over o w n e r s h i p of West N ew G u i n e a (or West Irian) and the i n t e r r e l a t e d q u e s t i o n of A m e r i c a n m i l i t a r y and econo m i c a s s i s tance to the S u k arno government.
In e x p l a i n i n g the D D P 's views, the c o m m e n t a r y seeks to i l l u m i n a te how and w h y the D D P fs a s s u m p t i o n s relate to those of o t her m a j o r e x e c u t i v e agency p a r t i c i p a n t s in the p o l i c y d ebate of the spring of 1961.
A br i e f c o n c l u s i o n addr e s s e s the complex empirical q u e s t i o n of h o w m u c h influence the D D P 's p e r s p e c t i v e s appear to have had on the u l t i m a t e target of all the aspi r a n t archit e c t s of Indonesia p o l i c y --P r e s i d e n t Kennedy.
The B u r e a u c r a t i c Politics Setting
Before p r o c e e d i n g w i t h the i n t e r p r e t a t i v e s u m m a r y it is n e c e s s a r y to introduce b r i e f l y the d r a m a t i s -personae of this " b u r e a u c r a t i c p o l i tics" s t r uggle for influence.
Since the c o llapse of the abortive U.S.-s u p p o r t e d r e b e l l i o n against Sukarno in the spring of 1958, the ma j o r b u r e a u c r a t i c groups and l eading p e r s o n a l i t i e s had t e n d e d to arrange themse l v e s into two informal coal i t i o n s or factions.
V a r i o u s l y c h a r a c te r i z e d by form e r p a r t i c i p a n t s and c o m m entators, they are labeled here as the " a c c o m m o d a t i o n i s t s " and the " h a r d -l i n e r s . " 16
In early 1961, w i t h the advent of a n e w a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , both the internal c o m p o s i t i o n of the factions and the b a l a n c e of p ower b e t w e e n them was in flux.
politics, as well as the broader interagency struggle for influence. See (in 10 more years!) "R. W. Komer memo to McG. Bundy commenting on CIA ((Bissell)) Indonesia paper," March 27, 1961, National Security File: Countries Series--Indonesia, Kennedy Library.
(Henceforth, file location is abbreviated in archival style, NSF:C0--Indonesia. Unless otherwise noted, all documents cited are housed at the Kennedy Li brary. ) 16The following brief and tentative sketch of the nature and distribution of influence on Indonesia policy within the Kennedy administration in early 1961 derives in part from a more extensive analysis of the influence patterns in 1962-63 contained in my "Kennedy Initiatives," pp. 84-95. The portrayal here also builds, however, on my conversations over the last six years with most of the former officials identified below. To protect their anonymity--at least with regard to particular judgments about particular personalities--! have limited footnoting in this section primarily to relevant published sources and documents. Reinforcing this decision is my recog nition that a more credible reconstruction demands both more data and greater famil iarity with decision-making theory than I currently command. This pr o c e s s of f a c t i o n a l r e a l i g n m e n t added to the c o m p l e x i t y of and the stakes i n v o l v e d in the poli t i c s of I ndonesia p o l i c y formulation. E s p e c i a l l y gi v e n the c i r c u m s t a n c e that few of the n e w top po l i c y o f f i cials--i n c luding the p r e s i d e n t --h a d had any substa n t i a l contact with I n d o n e s i a n p r o blems, there was c o n s i d e r a b l e o p p o r t u n i t y for the s u r v i v i n g fa c t i o n a l leaders to convert their n ew p o l i c y m a k i n g superiors to their r e s p e c t i v e v i e w s . 17
The H a r d -liners: The DDP and the EU R In early 1961 a small group w i t h i n the D D P fs Far E a s t e r n Di v i s i o n f u n c t i o n e d as the j u n i o r p a r t n e r in a h a r d -l i n e r c o a l i t i o n d o m i n a t e d by the State D e p a r t m e n t 's B ure a u of W e s t e r n E u r o p e a n A f f a i r s ( E U R ) . 18 While the E U R 's o p p o s i t i o n to a c c o m m o d a t i o n w i t h S ukarno stemmed from an i n s t i n c t i v e E u r o p e a n i s t , p r o -D u t c h outlook, the DDP's Far E a stern D i v i s i o n was b a s i c a l l y A s i a n i s t and i n t ensely S u k a r n o p h o b e in o r i e n t a tion.
D e s p i t e these d i f f e r i n g p e r s p e c t i v e s the two h a r d -l i n e r groups w o r k e d e f f e c t i v e l y till late fall 1961 to slow the o f f e n s i v e m o u n t e d by the e x p a n d e d forces of the a c c o m m o d a t i o n i s t s --e s p e c i a l l y on the West Irian q u e s t i o n . 19
This p a r t i a l success d e p e n d e d h e a v i l y on their a b i l ity to secure some i n f l u e n t i a l b a c k i n g at the top levels of their r e spective p a r e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n s. These n o t a b l e gains fro m among K e n n e d y 's n e w a p p o i n t m e n t s were, h o w ever, offset by o ther b u r e a u c r a t i c shifts that in D e c e m b e r 1961 u l t i m a t e l y gave the a c c o m m o d a t i o n i s t s full a s c e n d a n c y over Indo n e s i a policy. A m o n g the p e r s o n n e l c hanges damag i n g to the h a r d -l i n e r camp was the 17I am indebted to former Ambassador James Bell for his emphasis on the signi ficance of this knowledge factor in accounting for Ambassador Jones' relative success in commanding an audience in Washington.
Interview loss of the most ardent s p o k e s m a n for the A s i a n i s t -S u k a r n o p h o b e v i e w p o i n t inside the State Department.
This was Hu g h Cumming, S t a t e 's D i r e c t o r of I n t e l l i g e n c e and R e s e a r c h from 1956 to his re t i r e m e n t at the end of the E i s e n h o w e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n in late I 9 6 0 . 22 C u m m i n g 1s i m p o r t a n c e lay above all in the fact that he had e f f e c t i v e l y u s e d his c l o s e c on n e c t i o n s w i t h the Dulles brothers to cement a p e r s o n a l and i n s t i t u t i o n a l link b e t w e e n hard -l i n e r s in his INR and b o t h the C I A 's ana l y s t s in the DDI and its operators in the DDP.
It is this linkage r ole that m a k e s credible, for example, reports that Cumm i n g had a ma j o r role in sec u r i n g top-level s a nction for the D D P 's abor t i v e o p e r a t i o n in support of the I n d o n e s i a n regional r e b ellions in 1957-58.
The f a i l u r e of that o p e r a t i o n had a l ready eroded the i nfluence of the Suk a r n o p h o b e s in the INR and the DDP, but C u m m i n g 's r e p l a c e m e n t by Roger H i l s m a n was a clear symbol of the grow i n g threat to the h a r d -l i n e r s p o s e d by m a n y K e n n e d y a p p o i ntments.
A l t h o u g h his influence as D i rector of the INR was m o r e limi t e d than C u m m i n g 's h ad been, H i l s m a n 's s u b s e qu e n t a p p o i n t m e n t in early 1963 as A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y for Far E a s t e r n A f f a i r s saw h i m emerge as a m a j o r architect of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n 's g r a n d a c c o m m o d a t i o n i s t s t r a t e g y for chan n e l i n g S u k a r n o 's n a t i o n a l i s m into ''c o n s t r u c t i v e " c h a n n e l s . 23 What is not d i r e c t l y evident from the DDP p a p e r is that J o n e s 's views c o m m a n d e d risi n g support in several s t r a t e g i c l o c ations w i t h i n the administration.
His firmest base of s t r e n g t h was in the m i d d l e levels of the State D e p a r t m e n t 's B u reau of Far E a s t e r n A f f a i r s (FE) . Two key desk officers, Lind q u i s t for I n d o n e sia and I n g r a h a m for Aus t r a lia, shared w i t h their boss, James Bell, 22This account of Cummingfs role in the formulation of U.S. policy is based on the testimony of several informants who prefer anonymity. The Kennedy archives for early 1961 testify dramatically to the easy and exten sive access that Pauker enjoyed throughout the executive branch at that time. Not only are many of his memoranda and published articles prominent in the file, but he appears to be on a first-name basis with both White House advisers, including Walt Rostow, and DDP officials. The extent to which this extraordinary access translated into influence over policy is a question which I address in my forthcoming book as part of the broader issue of the role of scholars in the politics of Indonesia policy formulation. A l t h o u g h the Acting A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y John Steeves shared J o n e s 's sense of u r g e n c y about s e t t l i n g the W e s t Irian dispute, both he and the n e w l y d e s i g n a t e d A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y W a l t e r M c C o n a u g h y lacked the p e r s o n a l i t y and p o l i t ical w e i g h t to r epresent the FE e f f e c t i v e l y in intra-or i n t e r d e p a r t m e n t a l discussions. Not u ntil A verell H a r r i m a n 's app o i n t m e n t as A s s i s tant S e c r e t a r y for Far E a s t e r n Affa i r s in Nove m b e r 1961 w o u l d the J o n e s i a n s in State b e n e f i t from a r eceptive and influential boss.
Only t h e n was the FE able to c o n t ain the h i therto p a r a m o u n t influence of EUR over U.S. p o l i c y on W e s t Irian.
O u t side the State De p a r tment, the a c c o m m o d a t i o n i s t s ' c o a l ition i n c l u d e d quiet b a c k i n g f rom army elements in the D e p a r t m e n t of D e f e n s e . 27 T o g e t h e r w i t h D O D 's c i v i l i a n political advisers in the Office of I n t e r na t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A f f a i r s ( I S A ) , these elements p r i z e d the intimate r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the I n d o n e s i an army g e n e r a t e d by the still mo d e s t p r o
g r a m for tra i n i n g I n d o n e s i a n officers in the U.S.
Plans were already 2AfReinforcing these attitudes was the fact that all three men had served at least briefly in the Jakarta 29Amory's memo is cited below in the course of the analysis of the DDP's stand on West Irian. 30Rostow reports the division of labor with Bundy as follows: "There was plenty for both Bundy and me to do. We first split up the crises. He took Cuba, the Congo and Berlin, although I joined in the latter from time to time. I took Laos, Vietnam, Indonesia-and the developing world, generally, except Latin America, where Goodwin and Schlesinger operated.
I also was assigned the organization of policy planning from the White House end." Diffusion of Power3 p. 168. 
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The a s s e r t i v e Komer in p a r t i c u l a r be g a n to urg e that the W h i t e House c h a l lenge the E u r o p e a n i s t -d o m i n a t e d State D e p a r t m e n t 's tendency, supported by S e c r e t a r y Rusk, to d e t e r m i n e I n d o nesia p o l i c y .3t* It was this shift in the s u b s t a n c e and b u r e a u c r a t i c a s s e r t i v e n e s s of the p r e s i d e n t 's men in the Wh ite Ho u s e that w o u l d ev e n t u a l l y insure the o verall ascend a n c y of the a c c o m m o d a t i o n i s t s in K e n n e d y 's I n d o n e s i a policy.
Just as in the case of the B u r e a u of Far E a s t e r n A f f a i r s at State, the c u l m i n a t i o n of these changes A n I n t e r p r e t a t i v e S u m m a r y -DPP A s s e s s m e n t
F u nd a m e n t a l to the D D P 's adamant h a r d -l i n e p o l i c y p o s t u r e is its grim g eneral a s s e s s m e n t of " I n d o n e s i a 's g r o w i n g v u l n e r a b i l i t y to c o m m u nism" (par. I ) . 36
R e g i s t e r e d in the op e n i n g sente n c e of the paper, this a s s e s s m e n t rests on two basic a s s umptions about the dynamics of I n d o n e s i a n politics.
On the one hand, Sukarno is the "key factor" in O n the other hand, there is no d i s c e r n i b l e " c o u n t e r v a i l i n g f orce" w i t h suffic i e n t p o l i t i c a l s t r e n g t h to c hallenge Sukarno.
C o m p l a i n i n g that the a n t i c o m m u n i s t d i s s i d e n t m o v e m e n t s w h i c h about President Eisenhower's role in ordering the 1960 CIA assassination plot against Lumumba, the leftist Congolese leader. Church Committee, Report on Assassination Plots, pp. 55-60.
33A1though Komer emerges as more blunt than Johnson, both seem disposed by early April to urge a bold and early U.S. initiative to secure West Irian for Indo nesia. See below p. 148 and footnote 51. "Was it prearranged that after earlier PG discussion and request for revision of S/P paper new version should go straight to JFK over Rusk's signature? It seems to me this gives us only ex post facto reprise on whether such papers fill the bill."
See Robert Komer letter to Walt Rostow, April 5, 1961, NSF:CO--West New Guinea.
35See below, pp. 153ff., .for a discussion of Kennedyfs views. 36References to particular passages in the DDP document printed below will be made by noting in parentheses in the text the appropriate paragraph number of the document. Paragraphs cit^d from Attachments A and B will be designated by number and preceded by either A or B.
led the d i s a s t r o u s 1958 regi onal r e b e llions "have been p e r m i t t e d to w i t h e r from lack of s u s t e n a n c e , " the DDP concludes that they "no longer r e p r e s e n t a v i a b l e force in being" (par. 1).
As for the Indonesian army, to w h i c h the U.S. had shif t e d its poli t i c a l hopes after 1 9 5 8 , 37 the DDP judges it as " p r o g r e s s i v e l y mor e ineffectual in its contai n m e n t of c o m m u n i s m " (par. 1).
(Enunciated in the opening su m m a r y paragraph, t h e s e a s s e s s m e n t s of c o m m u n i st and free w o r l d "assets" in Indonesian p o l i t i c s find of t e n emotional, even paranoid, e l a b o r a t i o n in the two a t t a c h m e n t s to the central paper, e n titled a p p r o p r i a t e l y "A. President S u k a r n o --K e y to the I n d o n e s i a n S i t u a t i o n " 38 and "B. C o u n t e r v a i l i n g F o r c e s .") C l o s e l y l inked to these estimates of I n donesian p o l i t i c a l forces is a h i g h l y p e s s i m i s t i c v i e w of the c a p a b ilities of the U.S. The U n i t e d States is v i e w e d as p owe r l e s s either to deter S ukarno from his c o m m u n i z a t i o n p o l i c i e s or to r e s u s c i t a t e the i n e f fectual c o u n t e r v a i l i n g forces.
Only the removal of Sukarno can prevent the eventual legal a c c e s s i o n to p o w e r of the PKI, but "crude and v i o l e n t m e a s u r e s " are not a c c e p t a b l e i n s t r uments of U.S. policy.
In short, the situ a t i o n is f u n d a m e n t a l l y hopeless.
The D P P 's P o licy R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s C o n s i s t e n t w i t h its b asic assumptions, the DDP views the I n d o n e s ian p r e s i d e n t as the crucial factor in w e i g h i n g the m e r i t s of p r o p o s e d
c h a n g e s in U.S. policy.
The DDP p a per b r o a d l y identifies and evaluates t hree m a j o r a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i cies for deal i n g w i t h Sukarno.
In the D D P 's own terms, these are d esignated:
" a p p e a s e m e n t , " "a h a r d e n i n g p o s t u r e , w i t h o u t h o s t i l i t y , " and "crude and vi o l e n t i n t e r v e n t i o n . " In a s s e s s i n g these alternatives, the DDP seems o b s e s s e d w i t h d i s c r e d i t i n g " a p p e a s e m e n t , " in other words, the p o l i c y of seeking an a c c o m m o d a t i o n w i t h Sukarno.
But w h i l e u n r e l e n t i n g and concrete in its critic i s m s of " a p p e a s e m e n t , " the DDP is less empha t i c and less clear about its own p o l i c y pre f e r e n c e s .
It appears f i n a l l y to embrace, w i t h o u t enthusiasm, "a h a r d e n i n g posture, w i t h o u t h o s t i l i t y " and to reject "crude and v i o lent i n t e r v e n t i o n . "
T here remains, however, at least a note of u n c e r t a i n t y about the firmness of the D D P 's d isavowal of the ver y meth o d s that are its p e c u l i a r p r o f e s s i o n a l area of expertise. ment should the crisis deepen (par. 4). This shift would in turn re quire the U.S. to take a stand on "the validity of Indonesia's claim to sovereignty over West Irian." Having raised this probability, the DDP quickly dismisses the relevance of assaying "the legal merits" by contending that the two protagonists view the ownership issue "as a bare contest of power" (par. 5). Although self-conscious about this apparent "simplification" of the issue, the DDP analyst is clearly ob sessed with moving to the heart of the DDP brief on West Irian--and, very likely, the most urgent DDP priority in the.jousting for influence over Kennedy's approach to Sukarno's April visit.
In the longest single paragraph on the West Irian question, as well as in the entire paper, the DDP confronts Ambassador Jones's West Irian policy on the grounds that are most decisive in the thinking of all the official participants in the policy debate--"the security in terests of the United States" (par. 6). Having already voiced the general warning that Jones's proposed rapprochement with Sukarno would not alleviate the central problem of Indonesian vulnerability to commu nism, the DDP now seeks to demonstrate the perils in the main step in Jones's rapprochement strategy.
"We believe that accession to Indone sia's claim as long as Sukarno is in power would not serve the best interests of United States security in that part of the world. . . . In sum, by backing Indonesia's claim to sovereignty over West Irian, we may inadvertently help to consolidate a regime which is innately antagonistic toward the United States" (par. 6). The consequences of the Ambassador's policy are thus seen not only as futile, but even counterproductive.
The five contentions presented by the DDP to bolster this conclu sion conflicted with the key assumptions of the accommodationists, in cluding, in part, the views of the Director of the DDI. In predicting the likely course of Sukarno's foreign policy after he had secured West Irian with American diplomatic help, the DDP warned that Sukarno would reward the U.S. for its help by "cementing relations with the Soviet Union" and by embarking on "further irredentist ventures" (par. 6). This forecast directly contradicted the calculations of the pragmatic accommodationists, as well as the sometimes idealistic hopes of the Ambassador, that Sukarno could be enticed by the U.S. initiative into devoting himself to domestic economic development and adopting a western-oriented nonalignment stance abroad.
While Ambassador Jones was, in fact, more sanguine than he con cedes in his memoirs about beneficial consequences of Sukarno's secur ing West Irian with U.S. diplomatic assistance, he was at the time more directly concerned with the alleged domestic political impact of U.S. diplomatic intervention. Here, by contrast, the DDP underscores its earlier appraisal of the growing ineffectiveness of the Indonesian military as an anticommunist force--so long, at least, as Sukarno con tinued to be successful in neutralizing the army's sporadic anticommu nist maneuvers. While Jones was painfully aware of the army's politi cal weaknesses, including the chronic vacillation of Army Chief of Staff, General Nasution, noted in the DDP's Attachment B, he was more hopeful about the army's overall prospects, especially if the West Irian issue could be settled.
In short, Jones remained an exponent of what the DDP regarded as the faulty thesis that the Indonesian army would ultimately rescue Indonesia from the communist abyss (par. Bl). R e f l e c t i n g a m ajor cleavage b e t w e e n DDI and DDP a s s e s s m e n t s of I n d o n e s i a n politics, A m o ry's v i e w s dire c t l y c h a l l e n g e d the DDP's p e s s i m i s m about the p r o s pects of the army and other a n t i c o m m u n i s t forces in the wake of Indonesia's a c q u i s i t i o n of West Irian.
That brings me to the principal basic question of the object of the exercise. This I envisage to be the elimination from Indonesian politics of the issue on which, to our discomfort, Sukarno, the Com munists, and the Army are united. This can only be accomplished by, in effect, assuring the accession to Indonesia of Irian at a date sufficiently near in the future to cause the Indonesians to feel that the battle in principle is won. This will, of course, redound to Sukarno's credit, which is too bad. But, most importantly, once it has come about the bonds which now link the Army to Sukarno and in hibit all its efforts to counter his increasing accommodation of the Communists will loosen, if not disappear. In time the fundamental antipathy of the military and the Moslem hierarchy to Communism will emerge and give us a lever by which Indonesia may be guided into Indian-style genuine neutrality. problem. We should also let the Dutch know that the U.S. response to Indonesian attack on West New Guinea would be within the context of our responsibilities under the Charter to support U.N. action against aggression.
b) In discussions with Sukarno we should take the following line: The Dutch are in effective physical possession and control of West New Guinea. It appears impossible to get a direct transfer of the territory to Indonesia. The proposal for a trusteeship would (1) give the Indonesians a much greater opportunity to attempt to accomplish their purpose in the United Nations than they would have in the ab sence of a trusteeship, and (2) afford much greater freedom for both the Indonesians and the people of West New Guinea to form closer re lationships.
The c e nter of D u t c h support in W a s h i n g t o n was still, of course, the EUR.
Both l o y alty to a f a ithful D u t c h ally and the p o l i t i c o -s t r a te g i c i mp e r a t i v e of N A T O u n i t y in the face of re n e w e d Soviet pres s u r e s on B e r l i n r e i n f o r c e d the E U R 's general Europe a n i s t outlook.
By mid-F e b ruary, however, f o l l o w i n g the shifts evident in the p o s i t i o n of even the i n t e n s e l y a n t i -S u k a r n o D u t c h M i n i s t e r L u n s , EU R came to favor the c o n c e p t of a D u t c h t r a n s f e r of Wes t Irian to U.N. t r u s t e e s h i p .^6
A l t h o u g h the DDP p a p e r refl e c t s little of this o r t h o d o x E u r o p e a n ist o r i e n t a t i o n of the EUR, the a nalogy b e t ween Sukarno and H i tler (par. Al) does s uggest an u n c r i t i c a l transfer of W e s t e r n E u r o p e a n " l e s sons of h i s t o r y " to an A s i a n setting.
Far more decisive, however, in s h a p i n g the DD P p e r s p e c t i v e on West Irian was, again, its hat r e d for Sukarno.
D e s p i t e the d i v e r g e n t roots of their attitudes, the DDP and the E U R b o t h a t t a c h s imilar conditions to their approval of the State D e p a r t m e n t s U.N. t r u s t e e s h i p proposal.
A f t e r a p p l a u d i n g its v irtues in "d e f u s i n g the W e s t Irian time bomb" and reli e v i n g the U.S. of the incubus of siding w i t h the Dutch on a coloni a l i s t issue, the DDP is u n e q u i v o c a l on the two issues most salient among the Du t c h supporters. P u r p o s e l y ambiguous about just h o w this mi g h t be done, the D D P 's m i l i t a n t language c e r t a i n l y suggests at the v e r y least that W a s h i n g t o n should renew Se c r e t a r y D u l l e s 's 1958 p l e d g e to D u t c h F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r L u n s , to p rovide the D utch w i t h logistical s u p p o r t in the event of an I n d o n e s i a n attack on West Irian.Certainly z+6For the leading analysis of Dutch governmental, political and press opinion on West Irian, see Arend Lijphart, The Trauma of Decolonization (New Haven: Yale Uni versity Press, 1966). * * 7The high priority that Foreign Minister Luns attached to securing President Kennedy's reaffirmation of Secretary Dulles * s pledge is dramatically revealed in the record of Luns's meeting with Kennedy on April 10, 1961. Also revealed in that same record is the Kennedy administration's determined effort to retreat from the Dulles pledge to a refusal to provide military assistance outside the framework of the United Nations. See Dean Rusk Memorandum to John F. Kennedy: "Call by Dutch Foreign Minister Luns," especially fourth attachment: "Talking Points re West New Guinea Issue," a v e r b a l w a r n i n g alone w o u l d not meet the DDP insistence that the U.S. ''c o n f r o n t [Sukarno] w i t h u n m i s t a k a b l e m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of U n i t e d States r e s o l v e not to p e r m i t a s e t tlement of the West Irian issue by force of arms, . . . " W h a t e v e r the intent of the DPP, however, the Kennedy a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was d e t e r m i n e d to avoid being drawn into an armed conflict in support of wha t w o u l d be w i d e l y seen as the colo n i a l i s t position.
On
Both Adlai Stev e n s o n (the C a b i n e t -l e v e l A m b a s s a d o r to the U.N.) and H a r l a n Clev e l a n d (the A s s i s t a n t S e c r etary for I n t e r n a t i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n Affairs) h ad by early Ap r i l beg u n to raise their voic e s in wha t became a sust a i n e d c a m p a i g n thro u g h o u t the y e a r to resist U.S. c o m p r o m i s i n g on s e l f -d e t e r m i n a t i o n for the i n h a b i tants of West Irian.
Just as the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n did not exhibit a m o n o l i t h i c p o s i t i o n
on the de g r e e of U.S. interest in p r e v e n t i n g I n d onesia from using force, so it soon found itself split on the a p p l i c a t i o n of the p r i n c i ple of s e l f -d e t e r m i n a t i o n .
While v i r t u a l l y all A m e r i c a n p o l i c y m a k e r s felt an e m o t i o n a l a t t a c h m e n t to a p r i n c i p l e that was d e e p l y ingrained in the d o m i n a n t A m e r i c a n ideology, m a n y r e s i s t e d its absolu t i s t a p p l i c a t i o n in the case of Wes t Irian.
A few, like A m b a s s a d o r Jones and some of his acad e m i c allies, were familiar e n ough w i t h the long hist o r y of the Wes t Irian di s p u t e to know that the Indonesians in fact had a c o g e n t p o s i t i o n on the s e l f -d e t e r m i n a t i o n issue.
Leav i n g aside the q u e s t i o n of D u t c h abuse of that p r i n c i p l e in refusing for over a decade e i t h e r to n e g o t i a t e w i t h Indonesia on the issue or to initiate steps t o w a r d s e l f -d e t e r m i n a t i o n w i thin West Irian, the Indonesians argued that the West Irianese had already exer c i s e d their right of s e l f -d e t e r m i n a t i o n w h e n the D u t c h East Indies r e ceived its indepe n d e n c e as the I n d o n e s i a n state in 1 9 5 0 . 49
Pr a g m a t i c realpolitik was, however, the p r i m a r y basis for the p o s i t i o n of A m b a s s a d o r Jones and his allies in the internal debate. A p a r t from his s t a u n c h friends on the Indonesia desk, Jones enjoyed s t r a t e g i c a l l y p l a c e d b a c king from two of Walt R o s t o w 's W hite House a s s i s t a nt s , R o b e r t Komer and Robert J o h n s o n . 50
W i t h v a r y i n g degrees of r e l u c t a n c e they had conc luded that the p r i n c i p l e of s e l f -d e t e r m i n a t i o n mus t be s a c r i f i c e d before the intert w i n e d imperatives of avoid ing w a r and the e x p a n s i o n of communist influence in Indonesia.
For these p r a g m a t i s t s the U.N. t r u s t e eship concept was seen as acceptable only if it could be t r a n s f o r m e d into a v e h i c l e for a c h ieving their pr i m a r y 50See especially footnotes 32-34 above.
p o l i c y aim, i.e., the m o s t rapid p o s s i b l e t r ansfer of Wes t Irian to I n d o n e s i a n c ontrol w i t h only a tok e n o b s e r v a n c e of s e l f -d e t e r m i n a t i o n procedures. C e r t a i n l y this was the po s t u r e Komer a d v o c a t e d in his blunt c ritique of the State D e p a r t m e n t 's proposal in e arly April:
Walt--I confess great puzzlement over State's West New Guinea memo to the President. It now puts the issue clearly but comes up with no commensurate solution.
If the prime reason for a policy shift is to keep Indonesia from sliding away, we must come up with a solution which is broadly satisfactory to the Indonesians.
If we do not, we merely let ourselves in for a peck of trouble without gaining the advantage which led us to move in the first place.
Unfortunately, State's proposal is about the minimum movement we can make.
[censored]. Why move at all in this case?
Of course, if we are proposing trusteeship [censored] it might make sense. But if this is the case, why not tell the President? And why not spell out how the proposal (e.g., a plebiscite in three years) could be used to convince Sukarno that we are really moving in his direction.
The trouble with State is that it never thinks these problems through to the end. I'm sure we all agree that Indonesia will even tually get WNG, that we cannot afford to buck Sukarno on this issue while the Soviets back him [censored]. But we always enter these painful transitions with a little move that stirs up a ruckus and leads us from crisis to crisis before the issue is resolved in the way we knew it would be in the first place, but with all parties mad at us.51 Wh i l e f i n a l l y taking a p o s i t i o n clos e l y p a r a l l e l to K o m e r 's, Robert Amory, D i r e c t o r of the C I A 's DDI (where Komer served p r ior to 1961), q u a l i f i e d his firm r e c o m m e n d a t i o n for tran s f e r to Indonesia w i t h insistence on formal a d h e r e n c e to the s e l f -d e t e r m i n a t i o n principle: I believe we can have no morally justifiable position short of a properly supervised plebiscite, farcical as that will be considering the stone age level of the West New Guineans.
Indonesia has no claim ethnically to their allegiance and certainly has shown no administra tive capability that would justify turning the Irians [sic] over to them as wards. Thus, our room for maneuver seems limited to the question of duration, and I would suggest we start at ten years and be willing to slide to five, or even three.52 
M i l i t a r y and E c o n o m i c A i d as the Core of a Tw o -L ev e l P o s t -W e s t Irian S t r ategy
The interest of the p r a g m a t i c a c c o m m o d a t i o n i s t s in securing West Irian for Indon e s i a d e r i v e d from l o n g -t e r m hopes as well as s h o r t-term imperatives.
If the West Irian issue could be settled q u i c k l y to I n d o n e s i a^ s a t isfaction, there was the p o s s i b i l i t y of l aunching a twolevel p o s t -W e s t Irian stra t egy to channel Indone s i a n energies into more " c o n s t r u c t i v e " c h a n n e l s . 53
The overt level e n v i s i o n e d a c o m p r e hensive w e s t e r n p r o g r a m of e c o n o m i c a s s i s t a n c e d e s i g n e d to lure Sukarno away from f o r e i g n a d v e n t u r e s and into d o m e s t i c d e v elopment.
Concurrently, a mor e m o d e s t and less overt p r o g r a m of m i l i t a r y (and police) a s s i s tance w o u l d seek to s t r e n g t h e n bo t h the c a p a b i l i t i e s of conser v a t i v e s e c u r i t y forces and the i ntimacy of their ties to the A m e r i c a n m i l i tary. Wh i l e few of the a c c o m m o d a t i o n i s t s shared the h i g h o p t i m i s m of A m b a s s a d o r Jones about the overt s t r a t e g y of w o o i n g Sukarno, all of them v i e w e d m i l i t a r y a s s i s t ance as i n d i
s p e n s a b l e for ensu r i n g that the army w o u l d not only c h e c k any PKI move to seize power, but also rule a p o s t -S u k a r n o I n d o n e s i a .
As a l r e a d y noted, the DDP e v i n c e d deep s k e p t i c i s m about the f e a s i b i l i t y of b o t h levels of this l o n g -t e r m a c c o m m o d a t i o n i s t strategy, as well as the w i s d o m of r e s p o n d i n g to s h o r t -t e r m impera t i v e s to w i n West Irian for Sukarno. A c c o r d i n g l y , it is not s u r p r i s i n g that, in turning to the issue of m i l i t a r y and ec o n o m i c assistance, the DDP again r e g i s ters adamant o p p o s i t i o n to J o n e s 1 s re n e w e d pleas for W a s h i n g t o n to c o u n ter Soviet aid d i p l o m a c y by c o n t i n u i n g "a m o d e r a t e p r o g r a m of economic and m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e s u f f i c i e n t to bo l s t e r the p o l i t i c a l po s i t i o n of our friends w i t h i n I n d o n esia . . ." (par. 8).
C o n s i s t e n t w i t h this posture, Jones had a rgued the pr e v i o u s O c t o b e r that the U.S. should sa t i s f y e n o u g h of the I n d o n esian a r m y fs request for arms to stop it from turning to M o s c o w . * 5 * * W a s h i n g t o n 's d e c i s i o n then was to resp o n d instead to D u t c h pl e a s not to arm an aggres s i v e Sukarno.
Indeed, W a s h i n g t o n had gone even further by qu i e t l y slowing the d e l i v e r y of m o d e s t small arms supplies a l r eady c o m m i t t e d to Indonesia.
No w in the wake of General N a s u t i o n 's J a n u a r y arms deal w i t h the USSR, Jones r e v i v e d his appeal for r e s u m p t i o n of a m o d e r a t e level of aid.
De s p i t e its d esire to inspire the I n d o n e s i a n army to move more f i rmly against the Indo n e s i a n communists, the DDP felt that m i l i t a r y aid e n t a
i l e d not only the same risks a s s o c i a t e d w i t h d i p l o m a t i c support to Sukarno on West Irian, but illusions about U.S. influence in the p o s t -W e s t Irian period. "We are d i s p o s e d to argue that our natio n a l p o l i c y should be to treat I n d o n e s i a as a case in w h i c h appeasement, w h e t h e r by w o r d or by deed, will buy us nothing.
H ence to p r o p o s e s t e pped up aid as a b l u e p r i n t for future action simply begs the q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r Communist a s c e n d a n c y in I n d o n e s i a can be c u rbed as long as Sukarno remains in power.
We b e l i e v e it cannot" (par. 8).
The D P P 's E x p r e s s e d P r e f e r e nce for a " H a r d e n i n g " P osture there is v e r y little that the U.S. can do to a c c o m p l i s h that objective. In a g l o o m y lecture on the "ext r e m e l y limited influence" of the U.S. in Indonesia, the DDP seems r e signed to a grim l i m i t s -o f -p o w e r p e r s p e c tive that clashes w i t h the DDP's p r o f e s s i o n a l p r o c l i v i t y for an active, i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t p o l i c y (as e videnced by its c o n t e m p o r a r y o p e r ations in Cuba, the Congo, Laos, and Vietnam).
Moreover, the empha t i c and deeply p e s s i m i s t i c language of the DDP departs from the confident, activist style of the new " t o u g h -m i n d e d " K ennedy advisers.
It would be gratifying to be able to propose an alternative course of action by the United States which would stand a good chance of turn ing the course of events in Indonesia in a constructive direction. Unfortunately, this is a situation in which the influence that the United States can exert, at least in the short run, is extremely lim ited, if (as must be assumed) crude and violent intervention is ex cluded. Any "carrot" in the form of economic or military aid or diplomatic support that is freely given will (for reasons set forth above) be used simply to consolidate an essentially unacceptable regime. Any "stick" the United States would be willing to use would be too feeble to destroy the regime and would simply accelerate the process of disorganization which (it is argued above) is the probable prelude to a constitutional Communist take-over.
[Par. 9]
Before a t t e m p t i n g to account for this e x t r a o r d i n a r y DDP pessimism, it is instr u c t i v e to note the modest claims the DDP makes for what it endo r s e s as "the least u n s a t i s f a c t o r y p o l i c y for the U n i t e d States" (par. 9).
By "a h a r d e n i n g in our posture, w i t h o u t o vertones of h o s t i l ity or anger," the DDP p o l i c y hopes "to alert the c o n s e r v a t i v e elements a m ong I n d o n e s i a n l e a d e r s h i p to the ineluctable n e c e s s i t y of choosing b e t w e e n a b s o r p t i o n by the C ommunist Bloc and asso c i a t i o n s [s i c ] as an equal w i t h i n the comi t y of free W e s t e r n and A s i a n n a t i o n s " (par. 10). E s p e c i a l l y w h e n the DDP defines the p o l itical stakes in the stark a l t e r n a t i v e s of their m i l i t a n t cold war ideology, the q u e s t i o n arises a g a i n as to wh y the DDP is p r e p a r e d to conclude that there is so little that could be done to get rid of Sukarno.
To a nswer that critical question, two contrary inter p r e t a t i o n s m u s t be considered.
The first is that the DDP*s re s t r a i n t was p r i m a r ily a r e a c t i o n to its a b o rtive i n t e r vention in 1957-58 on the side of r e g i o n a l dissidents.
The second contends that c i r c u m s t a n t i a l evidence re q u i r e s further inquiry as to w h e t h e r the DDP paper represents a s u b t l e effort to p r o m o t e the very crude and v i olent me a s u r e s it o s t e n s i b l y rejects. The DPP's O s t e n s i b l e R e j e c t i o n of Crude and V i o l e n t M e a s u r e s The c r e d i b i l i t y of the D D P ?s a p p arent r e n u n c i a t i o n of crude and v i o l e n t i n t e r v e n t i o n in Indonesia rests not only on the D D P fs own words, but also on the l i k e lihood that W a s h i n g t o n p o l i c y m a k e r s we r e t h e n s k eptical about the f e a s i b i l i t y of launching covert o p erations in I n d o n e s i a .
That s k e p t i c i s m stemmed, first and foremost, from the DDP's a b o r tive efforts in 1957-58 to support the u n s u c c e s s f u l regional rebellions ag a i n s t S u k a r n o . 55
A l t h o u g h only alluded to o b l i q u e l y in the m e m o r a n d u m (par. A2), that debacle had s e nsitized m a n y --t h o u g h not all--the DD P staff to the risks i n v olved in external m a n i p u l a t i o n of complex and v o l at i l e Indone s i a n p o l i t i c s . 56
Moreover, r e g a r d l e s s of its own p r e f e r e n c e s , the DDP s u r e l y r e c o g n i z e d that the fore i g n poli c y b u r e a u c r a c y wou l d react to any r e n ewed DDP pleas for ac t i o n w i t h c o n s i derable reserve.
Even the i ntimate T u e s d a y lunch group and the Special Group, the NSC subcom m i t t e e r e s p o n s i b l e for author i z i n g covert action, wo u l d p r e s u m a b l y balk, in v i e w of a v e r y recent failure that had left the U.S., by the D D P 's own judgment, "vir t u a l l y b ereft" of p o l i t i c a l assets in Indonesia (par. B 4 ) .
A further legacy of the abortive 1958 i n t e r v e n t i o n argued even m o r e p o w e r f u l l y against any n e w DDP operations.
The case of the A m e r i can pilot, A l l e n Pope, was still so d i p l o m a t i c a l l y s e n sitive that the DDP a v o i d e d m e n t i o n i n g it even in this secret memorandum.
C h a r a c t e r ized o f f i c i a l l y by Presi d e n t E i s e n h o w e r as "a soldier of fortune," Pope was c a p t u r e d by I n d o n e s i a n a u thorities after his p lane was shot down d u r i n g a b ombing raid on A m b o n in April 1958. S u b s e q u e n t l y tried and s e n t e n c e d to death as an enemy of the state, Pope still r e m a i n e d in a J a k a r t a p r i s o n a waiting S u k a r n o 1s d e c i s i o n w h e t h e r or not to carry out the sentence.
As b o t h gove rnments recognized, I n d o n e s i a 's capture of Pope p r o v i d e d Sukarno w i t h the means to put s i g n ificant p r e s s u r e on the U.S. government.
Wh i l e that pres s u r e by itself could not p roduce s u b s t a n t i v e p olicy initiatives, it could function as another deterrent a g a i n s t any further CIA c l a n destine operations.
Finally, as is now e v i d e n t from a d e c l a s s i f i e d top secret m e m o r a n d u m from the CIA D i rector A l l e n Dulles to Presi d e n t K ennedy in early April, the A g e n c y itself a t t a c h e d subs t a n t i a l importance to w i n n i n g the release of a loyal e m p l o y e e .57 A p a r t from the impact of the 1958 debacle on both the real and p e r c e i v e d p r o s p e c t s for DDP pl o t t i n g in Indonesia, the DDP shared the c r i s i s -c e n t e r e d n e s s w h i c h affected the entire foreign p o l i c y b u r e a u c r a cy.
A 56Former U.S. officials inside the CIA and in other agencies have told me of the caution engendered in all but a few of the DDP*s personnel responsible for Indo nesian affairs.
57The CIAfs declassification of the Dulles memorandum on Pope provides the first public admission by the CIA of its covert support for the rebellion--not only its employment of Pope, but its covert "political-action program" in support of "the anti-Communist, pro-West dissident movement" in Indonesia in 1957-58. See Allen Dulles1s memorandum for Brig. General Chester V. Clifton, military aide to the Presi dent, "Allen L. Pope," April 7, 1961, NSF:CO--Indonesia. Given the significance of this document, it has been included as an appendix to this article. See below pp. 167-69. as w i t h p o l i t i c a l o p e r a t i o n s in Cuba, Laos, and the Congo, there was an in s t i n c t i v e r e l u c t a n c e in the DDP to stretch a l ready o v e r e x t e n d e d resources to assume the risks of even a mo d e s t scheme against Sukarno. Cl o s e l y r e l a t e d was the t e n d e n c y al r e a d y evident in the S o u t heast A s i a b r a n c h of the D D P 's Far E a s t e r n D i v i s i o n to v i e w the crises in Laos and V i e t n a m as an excuse for avoiding i nvolvement in I n d o n e s i a --e v e n though, at least in retr o s p ect, DDP D i r e c t o r Bissell r e a d i l y concedes I n d o n e s i a 's g r e a t e r p o l i t i c a l and strategic s i g n i f i c a n c e for the Un i t e d States.
P r o b a b l y t r o u b l e d by an e n f o r c e d p a s s i v i t y in the face of the d e t e r i o r a t i n g s i t u a t i o n in Indonesia, the DDP also m a n ifested, along w i t h other agencies, a te n d e n c y to escalate its estimate of the stakes involved in c h e c k i n g c o m m u n i s m in I n d o c h i n a . 58
De s p i t e the p l a u s i b i l i t y of the thesis that the DDP was g e n u i n e l y r e s i g n e d to the n e c e s s i t y of avoiding crude and vi o l e n t measures, a t t e n t i o n mus t be a c c o r d e d a c o n t r a r y conjecture, also b ased on both a rea d i n g of the DDP p a p e r and its b u r e a u c r a t i c context.
Mos t i m p ortant is the n a g g i n g su s p i c i o n that the implicit r e c o m m e n d a t i o n of the D D P 's analysis is to take immediate acti o n to remove the root of the In d o n e s i a p r o b l e m --S u k a r n o . But what action? For the analysis s y s t e m a t i c a l l y d i s credits the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of all the m ajor m e a s u r e s m o o t e d for che c k i n g Sukarno and communism. Revival of the regional d i s s i d e n t s is hopeless; the army remains at best a h i g h l y p r o b l e m a t i c c o u n t e r v a i l i n g force; and the U.S. is v i r t u a l l y b e reft of influence, w i t h no e f f e c t i v e ''c a r r o t s " or ''s t i c k s " --except for those ''s t i c k s " w h i c h it '' mus t be assumed are e x c l u d e d . "
In short, Sukarno is the problem: yet there are no viable means to deal w i t h him, except those crude and v i o l e n t m e a s u r e s w h i c h are ruled out.
C o n f r o n t e d w i t h this analysis, any official imbued w i t h the n ew p r e s i d e n t 's d e t e r m i n a t i o n to meet the ex p a n d i n g Soviet c h a l lenge on the Third W o r l d cold wa r b a t t l e g r o u n d w o u l d be likely to insist on r e e x a mining the p r o h i b i t i o n on crude and vi o l e n t measures.
Cert a i n l y the DDP invites such a r e e x a m i n a t i o n by s i g n aling its own u n h a p p i n e s s w i t h W a s h i n g t o n 's app a r e n t refusal f urther to su s t a i n the diss i d e n t r e g i o n a l i s t m o v e m e n t s (par. B 2 ) . A l t h o u g h the DDP asserts that by 1961 it is too late to r e s u s c i t a t e these moveme n t s , the i m p l i c a t i o n is that a more astute U.S. p o l i c y w o u l d have been to c o n t i n u e to support t h e m --p r e s u m a b l y at least w i t h f u n ds--as a p o t e n t i a l asset w h e n a ch a n g e d s i t u a t i o n p e r m i t t e d some form of re n e w e d p o l i t i c a l action against Sukarno.
The a v a i l a b i l i t y of a s s a s s i n a t i o n in 1961
as an e x t r a o r d i n a r y and yet l o g i s t i c a l l y simple f orm of i n t e r v e n t i o n also forces some r e v a l u a tion of the D D P 's p o l i c y posture.
A l t h o u g h u n d e r s t a n d a b l e not m e n t ioned in the m e m o r a n d u m , the D D P 's approval and p r a c t i c e of a s s a s s i n a t i o n in the early K e n n e d y years is well established.
The Church 
B issell te s t i f i e d that the a s s a s s i n a t i o n of
Sukarno had b e e n 'c o n t e m p l a t e d 1 by the CIA, but that p l a n n i n g had p r o c e e d e d no farther than ident i f y i n g an 'a s s e t ' w h o m it was b e l i e v e d might be r e c r u i t e d to kill Sukarno.
Arms w e r e s u p p l i e d to diss i d e n t groups in Indonesia, but, accor d i n g to Bissell, those arms were not intended for a s s a s s i n a t i o n (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 8 9 ) . " 60 If one argues that the D D P 's real intent was to urge immediate and v i o l e n t a c t i o n agai n s t Sukarno, h ow can one account for the at best h i g h l y ambi g u o u s p r e s e n t a t i o n of their views?
The most likely e x p l a n a tion of course w o u l d be the severe b u r e a u c r a t i c c o n s t r a i n t s on such candor.
As a l r e a d y noted, the DDP was p r e s u m a b l y a c u t e l y aware of the w i d e s p r e a d t e n d e n c y in the foreign po l i c y b u r e a u c r a c y to blame the DDP for the 1958 d e b a c l e and to be suspicious of new DDP proposals.
M o r e over, as the C h u r c h C o m m i t t e e has also shown, p r o p o s a l s for covert a c t i o n --l e t alone for a s s a s s i n a t i o n --a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y set down in w r i t t e n m e m oranda.
C a l c u l a t e d ambi g u i t y serves not only to prese r v e secrecy, but also to obsc u r e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . 61
Finally, there is the p o s s i b i l i t y --for which, however, there is no direct e v i d e n c e in this i n s t a n c e --that the DDP chose to circumvent the Special G roup alto g e t h e r and p l a n covert o p e r a t i o n s i n d e p e n d e n t l y of that formal e x e c u t i v e a u t h o r i t y .
C o n c l u s i o n -The I nfluence of the D D P / H a r d -l i n e P o s i t i o n
The P r e s i d e n t 's Post u r e d u r ing S u k a r n o 's Visit W h a t e v e r the degree of toughness p r e f e r r e d --a n d p r a c t i c e d --b y the DDP, P r e s i d e n t K e n n e d y in his m e e t i n g w i t h P r e sident S u k arno in late April b e g a n to embrace the m a i n i n g r edients of the a c c o m m o d a t i o n i s t s t r a t e g y w h i c h the DDP p a p e r de c r i e d so b i t t e r l y as ''a p p e a s e m e n t . " While his views w e r e m u c h c loser to the cautious v e r s i o n of a c c o m m o d a tion u r g e d by his W h i t e Ho u se aides than the more o p t i m i s t i c v e r s i o n r e p r e s e n t e d by A m b a s s a d o r J o n e s 's hopes for a ''n e w e r a " in U . S . -I n d o n e s i a n relations, the p r e s i d e n t was w i l l i n g to take the first steps in test i n g the w i s d o m of J o n e s 's assu m p t i o n s about b o t h S ukarno and the a r m y .
A l t h o u g h he c a r r i e d t h rough an a s s i d u o u s l y p l a n n e d pe r s o n a l effort to appeal to S u k a r n o 's vanity, Ke n n e d y did appear to b o w t e m p oraril y to the Du t c h and the D D P -E U R h a r d -l i n e r s by d e f e r r i n g the tangible p o l icy i n i t i a t i v e s sought by A m b a s s a d o r Jones.
On ec o n o m i c aid, for i n stance, he made only a h e a v i l y q u a l i f i e d offer to assist I n d o n e s i a 's n e w l y p r o c l a i m e d e i g h t -y e a r d e v e l o p m e n t plan.
A c o m p a r a b l e mode s t initi a t i v e in m i l i t a r y a s s i st a n c e for civic ac t i o n s e e m e d cert a i n to w i n K e n n e d y 's e v e n t u a l e n d o rsement, but again i m p l e m e n t a t i o n was p o s t poned.
O s t e n s i b l y the same p a t t e r n of m o d e s t gest u r e s but de l a y e d s u b stantial i n i t i a t i v e s s eemed to p r e v a i l on the central issue of West Irian.
It is n o t a b l e that despite S u k a r n o 's w i l l i n g n e s s to pledge P o p e 's release, the Ind o n e s ian leader did not impress Kenn e d y f a v o r ably.
In fact, K e n n e d y d e v e l o p e d a strong disl i k e for a m an w h o m eoIbid.y p. 4.
61Tbid., especially pp. 6-9 and 260-81, concerning "Findings and Conclusions Relating to Authorization and Control." he v i e w e d as m o r a l l y corrupt, not only for his w i d e l y p u b l i c i z e d p h i l a n d e r i n g (which had offe n d ed S e c r e t a r y Rusk and others) but also for his a p p arent i n d i f f e r e n c e to the w e l l -b e i n g of his then 100 m i l l i o n p eople.
U n l i k e the DDP, however, the pres i d e n t did not permit his p e r s o n a l a n t i p a t h i e s to influence his p o licy j u d g m e n t . 62
The DDP and EU R may have taken solace in this lack of major c h a n g e s in U.S. p o l i c y toward Indonesia, as well as in K e n n e d y 's new p e r s o n a l d i s l i k e for Sukarno.
Yet, as already evident from the d i s c u s s i o n at the o utset of this commentary, even in A pril 1961 the trends in U.S. b u r e a u c r a t i c politics wer e d e f i n i t e l y m o v i n g toward p r a g m a t i c a c commodation.
R ein f o r c i n g those b u r e a u c r a t i c changes were the d i s p o s i t i o n s of P r e s i d e nt K ennedy himself.
The P r e s i d e n t 's D i s p o s i t i o n s 63
As r e f l e c t e d b o t h in the rhetoric of his inaugural address and in his initial ac t i o n s in Laos, Cuba, and the Congo, P r e s i d e n t Kenn e d y a t t a c h e d the m o s t urg e n t p r ior i t y to m e e t i n g what he p e r c e i v e d as an a w e s o m e c h a l l e n g e from a m o n o l i t h i c c o m m u n i s m expa n d i n g into the Third World.
As m a n i f e s t e d in his rapid a d option of a more s o p h i s t i c a t e d and c o stly m i l i t a r y strat e g y of flexible response, he acted d e c i s i v e l y in 1961 to s t r e n g t h e n what might be called the T hird W o r l d frontiers of the informal A m e r i c a n empire. E s p e c i a l l y in 1961-62 K ennedy seems to have been v e r y m u c h a part of a cold war ambience which, the Church C o m m i t t e e found, led m a n y of the most r espected A m e r i c a n officials to b e l i e v e that a s s a s s i n a t i o n '' was in the best interests of the c o u n t r y . " A c c o r d i n g l y , one is inclined to conclude that K e n n e d y 's p r e f e r e n c e for n o n c o e r c i v e s t r a t e g i e s in Indonesia did not derive from any special m o r a l r e p u g n a n c e for ''crude and v i o l e n t " measures, so long as they c o u l d be j u s t i f i e d by the cause of ''the free w o r l d . "
Co n g r u e n t w i t h this c o njecture about K e n n e d y 's pr o b a b l e a d herence to c o n v e n t i o n a l cold wa r m o r a l i t y is the c o n t e n t i o n of James M a c G r e g o r Burns, his most p e r c e p t i v e biographer, that Kenn e d y lacked firm moral com m i t m e n t s .
At the same time, some r e v i s i o n i s t s tend to be unfa i r to K e n n e d y in d i s c o u n t i n g other dimens i o n s of his approach to foreign p olicy, e s p e c i a l l y in the Third World. C e r t a i n l y comp a r e d to E i s e n h o w e r and Dulles, if not to S t e v e n s o n and Bowles, Kennedy e xhibited u n d e r s t a n d i n g of and s y m p a t h y for T hird World n a t ionalism, neutralism, and n o n v i o l e n t social revolution. W h i l e not as salient as his cold war instincts, K e n n e d y 's under-., s t a n d i n g and s y m pathy w ere p r o b a b l y necessary, if by no means s u f f i cient, p r e c o n d i t i o n s for his opting for the st r a t e g y of accommodation. Finally, K e n n e d y 's i n t ensely activist p e rsonal style should not be ov e r l o o k e d .
He w e l c o m e d o p p o r t u n i t i e s to test out the new theories of e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t and c o unt e r i n s u r g e n c y , just as he w a r m e d to the p e r s o n a l c h a l l e n g e of de a l i ng w i t h other heads of state as well as his own p o l i c y a d v i s e r s --i n c luding those from the DDP. B e n e a t h the surface, however, it had b e e n clear for some time to all the p o l i c y insiders that the U.S. had r e c o g n i z e d that W e s t Irian must go to Indonesia even if Irianese selfd e t e r m i n a t i o n had to be p r o forma.
That d e c i s i o n in turn signaled the rise of the a c c o m m o d a t i o n i s t s to as c e n d a n c y as a r chitects of K e n n e d y 's a m b i t i o u s i n i t i atives for c han n e l i n g S u k a r n o 's radical n a t i o n a l i s m into c o n s t r u c t i v e d o m e s t i c development.
Not until over three years later, in the summer of 1964, amid both e s c a l a t i o n of the U.S. war in V i e t n a m and I n d o n e s i a 's b u d d i n g a l l iance w i t h China, did the hard-l i n e r s a c h i e v e parity, if not ascendancy, in A m e r i c a n p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n . 6^ W h e t h e r the revival of the h a r d -l i n e o r i e n t a t i o n in 1964-65 also p r o As i n d i c a t e d in B i s s e l l 's cover m e m o r andum, he sent F i t z g e r a l d 's paper to top a d m i n i s t r a t i o n f o r e i g n p o l i c y officials, i ncluding M c G e o r g e Bundy, P r e s i d e n t K e n n e d y 's Special A s s i s t a n t for N a t ional S e c u r i t y Affairs.
It is thus not s u r pri s i n g that B u n d y 's copy of the original m e m o r a n d u m appe a r e d on the K ennedy L i b r a r y 's i n v e n t o r y of K e n n e d y 's Nati o n a l S e c u r i t y File: Coun t r y S e r i e s --Indonesia.
P r e p a r e d in 1973 at my request, this i n v e n tory of doc u m e n t titles p e r m i t t e d me not only to gauge the significance of this document, but to identify it w i t h the p r e c i s i o n n e c e s s a r y to initiate a formal re q u e s t to the CIA for '' m a n d a t o r y c l a s s i f i c a t i o n r e v i e w . "
By the terms of P r e s i d e n t N i x o n 's p o s t -Pentagon Papers E x e c u tive Order 11652 (March 8, 1972) , any c l a s s i f i e d d o c u m e n t more than ten years old was h e n c e f o r t h subject to such review.
H a p p i l y for both scholars and the A m e r i c a n public, the CIA r e s p o n d e d f a v o r a b l y to my request.
In a letter to the K e n n e d y Li b r a r y on S e p t e m b e r 9, 1973, the A g e n c y a u t h o r i z e d the d e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of the entire twen t y -t w o page doc u m e n t w i t h the m i n o r e x c e p t i o n of a bri e f r e f e r e n c e to source m a t e rial on p. 6.
For scholars i n t e r e s t e d in s t u dying the origi n a l d o cument in the context of other r e l e v a n t I n donesia m a t e r i a l in the Ke n n e d y period, I r e c o m m e n d a trip to the K e n n e d y Library.
C u r r e n t l y h o u s e d in the Federal Records C enter on 380 Tr a p e l o Road in Waltham, M a s s a chusetts, the L i b r a r y is st a f f e d by h igh l y inte l l i g e n t and r e s p o n s i v e archivists who can lead the r e s e a r c h e r th r o u g h the i ntricacies of not only the N a t ional S e c u r i t y File but a n u mber of other r e l e v a n t d e c l a s s i f i e d and u n c l a s s i f i e d m a t e r i a l s , inc luding an ex t e n s i v e c o l l e c t i o n of oral h i s tory interviews d o n a t e d by m a j o r offi c i a l s from the Ke n n e d y period. A l t h o u g h m a n i f e s t l y less v a l u a b l e than the L i b r a r y itself, the C a r r o l l ton P r e s s 's Declassified Documents Reference System no w provides ready access to m i c r o f i c h e copies of the originals, as well as a useful index to ne w l y r e l e a s e d documents.
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I n d o n e s i a n P e rspectives The former propels that c ountry t o w a r d the Soviet orbit.
The latter sap the p o l i tical f o u n d a t i o n of any o r g a n i z e d attempt to deny the Comm u n i s t Party a mass base, strive to n e u t r a l i z e the I n d onesian A r m y as a force o p p o s i n g communism, and pe r m i t economic m a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n to stifle all c o n s t r u c t i v e impulses toward improving the lot of the I n d o n e s i a n people. D i s s i d e n t m o v e m e n t s on Java and the outlying islands, w h i c h have a b a s i c a l l y a n t i -C o m m u n i s t orientation, have b een p e r m i t t e d to w i t h e r from lack of sustenance.
They are now v i r t u a l l y on their last legs and no longer repr e s e n t a viable force in being.
In A t t a c h m e n t B to this paper, e n t itled ''C o u n t e r v a i l i n g F o r c e s ? " , we attempt to shed light up o n the factors w h i c h r ender the I n d o n e s i a n A r m y p r o g r e s s i v e l y m o r e ineffectual in its c o n t a i n m e n t of communism, and p resent an estimate of d i s sident s t r e n g t h u p o n w h i c h we base our c o n c l u s i o n that as a p o l i t i c a l p o w e r factor it no longer counts. Wh i l e it can be argued that the vas t m a j o r i t y of the rural p o p u l a t i o n of I n d o n e sia are impervious to the h a rdships of life on a bare s u b sistence level, the u r b a n pro letariat, e s p e c i a l l y in Java, may be found less supine.
A n E i g h t -Y e a r Plan has been launched, p r e d i c a t e d on the a v a i l a b i l i t y of foreign loans on a u n r e a l i s t i c scale of magnit u d e .
A growing b u d g e t a r y load will have to be borne in order to fund I n d o n e s i a 's p r e p a r a t i o n s for a show d o w n over West Irian.
The e x p a n s i o n of I n d o n e s i a 's m i l i t a r y e s t a b l i s h m e n t is bo u n d to m a k e h e a v y inroads into I n d o n e s i a 's financial resources. Conse q u e n t l y , a cont inuing and a c c e l e r a t e d decline in the e c o n o mic life of I ndonesia is very probable.
While economic atrophy m a y set the stage for a C o m m unist uprising, we consider it more likely that (barring c o m p l e t e l y u n f o r e s e e n developments) S u k a r n o 's ''G u i d e d D e m o c r a c y " will be p e r m i t t e d by the PKI to run its n a t u r a l course.
This w o u l d enable the C o m m unist Party to take over the l e a d e r s h i p of Indo n e s i a at a time w h e n radical changes in the m e t h o d s of a d m i n i s t e r i n g I n d onesian do m e s t i c affairs b e come the i n e s c a p a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e to p e rpetual chaos.
Even a c h i e v e m e n t of a mo d u s vive n d i b e t w e e n the U n i t e d States and P r e s i d e n t Suka r n o could not stave off such a development. p. 3 3. W h i l e m a n y factors of the Indonesian s i t u ation remain objects of contention, it w o u l d be hard to deny S u k a r n o 's r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the e c o nomic d e cline of Indonesia.
That his d i c t a t o r s h i p m a y p o s s i b l y endure as long as he lives strikes us as the crux of the I n d o n e s i a n problem.
In A t t a c h m e n t A of this paper, e n t i t l e d ''P r e s ident Sukarno -Key to the Indonesian S i t u a t i o n , " we are a ttempting to throw into more striking relief the m a n y insol u b l e p roblems besetting Indonesia, which can d i r e c t l y be trac e d b a c k to S u k a r n o 's p e r s o n a l i t y and to the po l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y that animates him.
As we see it, S u k a r n o 's c o n t i n u e d l e a d e r s h i p of I n d o n e s i a --i r r e s pective of his m o m e n t a r y fr i e n d s h i p s w i t h the Bloc or the W e s t --r e n d e r s Indonesia i n c r e a s ingly m o r e v u l n e r a b l e to PKI strategy, w h i c h is to make its d e cisive bi d for legal p ower under circu m s t a n c e s of economic and p o l i t i c a l chaos w i t h all other p o l itical solutions e v i d ently exhausted.
4.
The f o r t h c o m ing talks b e t ween P r e sidents K ennedy and Sukarno wil l take p lace in the shadow of a threat of war be t w e e n I ndonesia and the N e t h e r l a n d s over West Irian.
The U n ited States, h a v i n g thus far o b served ''i m p a r t iality" re g a r d i n g this issue, m a y be forced to abandon this stance, should the crisis deepen.
W i t h a b a n d o n m e n t of ''i m p a r t i a l i t y " c o n n o t i n g i n v o l v e ment, the U n i t e d States Government will have no choice but to take a p o s i t i o n r e g a r d i n g the v a l i d i t y of I n d o n e s i a 's claim to p. 4 s o v e r e i g n t y over Wes t Irian.
5.
This p a p e r does not intend to address itself to the legal meri t s of the r esp e c t i v e claims a d vanced by Indonesia and the N e t herlands.
Bot h nations have made it a b u n d a n t l y clear that they do not c o n sider the o w n e rship issue as " sub j u d i c e " but as a bare c o n test of power, w i t h Indonesia claiming that its n a t i o n a l i n d e p e n d e n c e will n e c e s s a r i l y r e main incomplete and in p e r m a n e n t j e o p a r d y as long as the Neth e r l a n d s m a i n t a i n s its hold over W e s t Irian.
We realize that this ma y be c o n s i d e r e d a s i m p l i f i c a t i o n of an issue w h i c h has become a h i g h l y sensitive i n ternal p o l i t i c a l q u e s t i o n in both countries, c o m p l i c a t e d by c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of n a t ional pride and ''f a c e " and by the entire h i s t o r y of D u t c h -I n d o n e s i a n relations.
6.
W i t h o u t s u g gesting that other factors can be ignored in d e t e r m i n i n g U n i t e d States po l i c y r egarding West Irian, we b e l ieve that one important aspect has not as yet bee n given suffic i e n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n --n a m e l y , ho w U n i t e d States interests will be a ffected if Indonesia carries the day and ownership of West Irian is awarded to her.
We believe that a c c e ssion to I n d o n e s i a 's claim as long as Sukarno is in power w o u l d not serve the best interests of Unit e d States security in that part of the world.
We c o n s i d e r it likely that I n d o n e s i a 's success in this p a r t i c u l a r instance will set in train the launching of further p. 5 ir r e d e n t i s t v e n t u r e s already f o r e s h a d o w e d in lectures given by P r o f e s s o r Yamin, an avowed extremist who, however, is a member of the I n d o n e s i a n c abinet close to P r esident Sukarno. Success w o u l d be b o u n d to cement relations b e t w e e n Indonesia and the USSR, which, in a d d i t ion to throwing the full weig h t of its p o l i t i c a l support b e h ind the West Irian campaign, is liberally p r o v i d i n g Indo n e s i a w i t h m i l i t a r y aid s p e c i f i c a l l y d e signed to enable her to oust the Du t c h from W e s t Irian by force of arms. P r e s i d e n t S u k a r n o 's prest i g e and p ower in I n d o nesia and in Asi a as a w h o l e w o u l d g r o w immeasurably, since n o t h i n g succeeds like success.
E v e n assu m ing that it we r e the w e i g h t of Uni t e d States power and p r e s t i g e w h i c h gained I ndonesia a b l o o dless and p r e s tigious victory, we w ou l d not gain that c o u n t r y 's respect, let alone affection.
I n d o n e s i a 's l e adership w o u l d see to it that the true r e c o r d of events w o u l d be slanted to s u b stantiate the boast that it was the threat of U S S R intervention, the leadership of P r e s i d e n t S u k arno and the u n f l i n c h i n g support given him by the C o m m u n i s t P arty w h i c h c o m bined in m a k i n g this vi c t o r y p o s sible.
P r e d i c t i o n s that the I n d onesian armed forces, once freed from their p r e o c c u p a t i o n s wit h the Du t c h threat, w o u l d be able to c o n c e n t r a t e u p o n d isl o d g i n g comm u n i s m from p o s i t i o n s of i n fluence tend to ignore the d e m o n s t r a t e d e f f e c t i v e n e s s of P r e s i dent S u k a r n o 's tactics of n ever allowing the army a sufficient b r e a t h i n g spell to c o n s olidate and m e t h o d i c a l l y depl o y its p. 6 p o l i t i c a l s t r e n g t h in c o m b a t t i n g communism. There is n o thing to e n c o u r a g e the b e l i e f that President Sukarno intends to a b a n don those tactics once West Irian has been annexed.
In sum, by bac k i n g I n d o n e s i a 's c laim to s o v e r e i g n t y over Wes t Irian, we ma y i n a d v e r t e n t l y help to c o n s o l i d a t e a regime w h i c h is innately a n t a g o n i s t i c tow a r d the U n i t e d States.
7.
The p r o p o s a l of a U n i t e d Nations trusteeship, w h i c h the D e p a r t m e n t of State appears to favor, w o u l d go a long w ay toward d e -f u s i n g the West Irian time bomb w h i c h P r e s i d e n t Sukarno h i m self has primed.
It w o u l d p r e sent an at least t e m p o r a r y s o l u tion of the problem, p e r m i t t i n g the U n i t e d States to escape the o p p r o b r i u m of h a v i n g sided w i t h the N e t h e r l a n d s on a ''coloniali s t " issue.
However, unless c o n f r o n t e d w i t h u n m i s t a k a b l e m a n i festa t i o n s of U n i t e d States resolve not to perm i t a s e t tlement of the West Irian issue by force of arms, and of our v i gorous o p p o s i t i o n to t u r ning this area over to the Indonesians w i t hout any o b s e r v a n t s of s e l f -d e t e r m i n a t i o n proc e d u r e s , the Sukarno regime w o u l d be u n l i k e l y to a cquiesce in the i m p o s i t i o n of such a trusteeship.
8.
It has bee n argued [censored] that the n e w p o l i c y of the Soviet u n i o n v i s -a -v i s I ndonesia leaves us w i t h only one p r a c t i c a b l e alternative, namely, "to c o ntinue a m o d e r a t e p r o g r a m of eco n o m i c and m i l i t a r y as s i s t a n c e suff i c i e n t to bols t e r the p. 7 p o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n of our friends w i t h i n I n d o n e s i a and to enable those w ho are w i l l i n g to stand on p r i n c i p l e to do so w i t h o u t being s u b m e r g e d by the o v e r w h e l m i n g t e m p t a t i o n of and pres s u r e s e n g e n d e r e d by Soviet o f f e r s . " The fore g o i n g a l t e r n a t i v e wou l d seem to e p i t o m i z e policies that have been tried by the U n i t e d States G o v e r n m e n t since Indonesia gained her ind e p e n d e n c e and that have f ailed in the at t a i n m e n t of their set obje c t i v e s to keep I n d o n e s i a out of Comm u n i s t hands.
We are d i s p o s e d to argue that our n a t i o n a l p o l i c y should be to treat I ndonesia as a case in w h i c h a p p easement, w h e t h e r by w o r d of [sic] by deed, will buy us nothing.
Hence to p r o p o s e stepped up aid as a b l u e p r i n t for future a c t i o n simply begs the q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r Communist a s c e n d a ncy in I n d o n e s i a can be curbed as long as Sukarno remains in power.
We beli e v e it cannot. 9 9. It w o u l d be g r a t i f y i n g to be able to p r o p o s e an a l t e r nati v e c ourse of a ction by the U n i t e d States w h i c h w o u l d stand a good chance of tu r ning the course of events in Indonesia in a c o n s t r u c t i v e direction.
U n f o r t u n a t e l y , this is a situ a t i o n in w h i c h the i n f luence that the U n i t e d States can exert, at least in the short run, is e x t r e m e l y limited, if (as must be assumed) crude and v i o l e n t i n t e r v e n t i o n is excluded.
An y ''c a r r o t " in the form of e c o n o m i c or m i l i t a r y aid or d i p l o m a t i c support that is freely g i v e n will (for reasons set forth above) be used simp ly to c o n s o l i d a t e an e s s e n t i a l l y u n a c c e p t a b l e regime.
A n y "stick" p. 8 the U n i t e d States w o u l d be w i l l i n g to use w o u l d be too feeble to d e s t r o y the r e g i m e and w o u l d simply a c c e l e r a t e the process of d i s o r g a n i z a t i o n w h i c h (it is argued above) is the proba b l e p r e l u d e to a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l C ommunist take-over. U n d e r these d i f f i c u l t c i r c u m s t a n c e s we beli e v e that the least u n s a t i s f a c t o r y p o l i c y for the U n i t e d States is to apply pr e s s u r e s , but poli t e l y and w i t h o u t p u b l i c r e c r imination, to offer favors, but only on t ough co n d i t i o n s , and in these wa y s to create such inducements as we can for the I n d o n e s i a n elite, b o t h c i v i l i a n and military, and for S u k a r n o himself, to behave in a mo r e c o n s t r u c t i v e fashion.
10.
At the v e r y m i n i m u m we should not n o w e n t e r t a i n any m a j o r i n c r e a s e s in the scale of e c onomic or m i l i t a r y aid to Indon e s i a and we s h o u l d loose [sic] no o p p o r t u n i t y to make clear that the r e a s o n for our ne g a t i v e action is that the Indonesians are in no p o s i t i o n to make e f f e c t i v e use of such reso u r c e s in p u r s u i t of g o als w e can support.
Perhaps this p r e s s u r e can best be a p p l i e d a f f i r m a t i v e l y by giving the i m p r e s s i o n that we w o u l d c o n s i d e r s u b s t a n t i a l e c o n o m i c aid if d i f f i c u l t but e s s e n t i a l l y t e c h n i c a l c o n dit i o n s we r e met and that we w o u l d consider i n c r e a s e d m i l i t a r y aid if we had c o n f i d e n c e that I ndonesia would not r esort to a g g r e s s i o n against the D u t c h and that their m i l i tary services had not a l r e a d y b e c o m e d a n g e r o u s l y d e p e n d e n t on Comm u n i s t Bloc support.
Our attitude on these m a j o r matters, p. 9
and on s p e c i f i c p o l i t i c a l issues as they arise, should be made known, u s i n g all a v a ilable contacts, to the m i l i t a r y e s t a b l i s h men t and the l eading p o l i t i c i a n s as well as to Sukarno himself. Such a h a r d e n i n g in our posture, w i t h o u t o v e r t o n e s of h o s t i l i t y or anger, w o u l d serve to alert the c o n s e r v a t i v e e l ements among In d o n esia's l e a d e r s h i p to the inel u c t a b l e n e c e s s i t y of choosing b e t w e e n a b s o r p t i o n by the C o m m u n i s t Bloc and a s s o c i a t i o n s as an equal w i t h i n the c o m i t y of free W e s t e r n and A s i a n nations. To take the o p p o s i t e p o s i t i o n --t o a p p ease S u k a r n o on the West Irian and o ther q u e s t i o n s , and to comp e t e w i t h the Bloc in economic and m i l i t a r y aid in the v a i n hope of g a i n i n g t i me--would, we believe, f i n a l l y d e s t r o y the r e s olve of c o n s e r v a t i v e elements to o p p o s e S u k a r n o ' s p o licies and to act as a b r a k e on the l e f t war d and d o w n w a r d course of Indonesia.
11.
The c oming talks b e t w e e n the P r e s i d e n t and his I n d o n e sian guest offer an important o p p o r t u n i t y to c o n v i n c e Sukarno of the firm n e s s of the U n i t e d States p o s i t i o n on an occa s i o n w h e n the t r e a t m e n t a c c orded h i m should be f l a t t e r i n g and should itself c o n v i n c e h i m of the i m p o r t a n c e this g o v e r n m e n t attaches to the f u t u r e of his country.
It is i m portant that "red carpet" treat m e n t and the c i r c u m s t a n c e of a P r e s i d e n t i a l m e e t i n g should not give h i m the i m p r e s s i o n that the U n i t e d States is p r e p a r e d to s upport h i m in the b a s i c a l l y h o s t i l e and u n c o n s t r u c t i v e course he c u r r e n t l y pursued. 3. S ukarno needs foreign poli c y successes, his domestic p e r f o r m a n c e hav i n g been an u n b r o k e n chain of failures.
Without the s upport of the C o mmunist bloc, he w ould be u n a b l e to score any m a j o r fo r e i g n p o l i c y successes.
The A f r o -A s i a n bloc is u n likely to choose him as its leader, although it will pr o b a b l y support him on " c o l o n i a l i s t 1 1 issues.
His close alignment wit h the USSR, and the a c q u i s i t i o n of West Irian w i t h Soviet support, w o u l d r e d o u n d to the growth of his stature in the eyes of the leaders of that bloc.
4.
There is r e a s o n to b e lieve that the Soviets have taken S u k a r n o 's m e a s u r e and handle him accordingly, by a s s i d u o u s l y p a n d e r i n g to his a s p irations to become an i n t e r n ational bigp. 4 shot. He may by n o w have become as sus c e p t i b l e to Soviet influence as he was to J a p a n e s e influence in the years [1942] [1943] [1944] [1945] . The Soviets kno w that, u n like other n e u t r a l i s t leaders of the c a l i ber of Nehru, N a s s e r and Nkrumah, Sukarno is h i g h l y m a n ipulatable.
To v i e w the r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n Sukarno and the Kremlin in its ent i r e t y as a prod u c t of love u n r e q u i t e d by the Un i t e d States, flies in the face of facts.
Evidence can be adduced to show that S u k a r n o 's own poli t i c a l p r o c l i v i t i e s are such that he w o uld n o r m a l l y tend toward leftist alignments.
He acknowledges h imself to be a socialist, and that he has a p r e d i l e c t i o n toward t o t a litarianism, can ha r d l y be denied.
5.
A great deal has bee n w r i t t e n about P resident S u k a r n o 's relations w i t h the Communist Party of Indonesia.
By fastening on the q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r he hi m s e l f is or is not a Communist, the issue can only be obfuscated.
Even S u k a r n o 's most effective apologist, F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Subandrio, does not deny that Sukarno is firmly r e s o l v e d to avail h i m s e l f of C o m m unist support in the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of his concepts and programs, and admits that such support has b e e n ge n e r o u s l y forthcoming.
That this a r r a n g e ment has served to foster the enormous g r owth of orga n i z e d c o m m u n i s m in Ind o n e s i a is ge n e r a l l y admitted.
No serious student of the use of the ''o r g a n izational w e a p o n " by c o m m u n i s m could p. 5 c o n ceive of its being e f f e c t i v e l y co n t a i n e d w i t h i n the m e c h a n i s m of a N a t i o n a l Front organization.
6. W h e t h e r or not Sukarno has reached a formal u n d e r s t a n d ing w i t h K h r u s h c h e v to r e s t r a i n the a r m y 's attempts to contain C o m munist inf l u e n c e in Indonesia remains a mo o t point. D e p e n d able I n d o n e s i a n o b s e rvers feel that Sukarno is comp e l l e d by h i s t o r i c a l forces to move in a ce r t a i n direction:
he is anti-W e s t e r n and w a nts to continue the I n d onesian Revolution. Sukarno has no choice but to pr o t e c t the C o m munist Party of Indonesia, beca u s e he needs support from a r e v o l u t i o n a r y group, and no other group but the Communists can give it to him.
The army, tho u g h it had its o r ig i n in revolution, is not r e v o l u t i o n a r y eno u g h for his purposes.
Consequently, the r e l a t i o n s h i p b e tween S ukarno and the C o m m unist Party is a natural one.
As long as it supports him, he w i l l be glad to leave it alone.
Concomitantly, he can u t i l i z e it, and does, to forestall any attempts on the part of the army to increase its p o l i t i c a l leverage.
This a r r a n g e m e n t ma k e s it quite easy for Sukarno to rem a i n friends w i t h the U S S R and, for that matter, Red China.
7.
U n l e s s the C omm u n i s t P a r t y commits a m a j o r tactical blunder, u n f u r l i n g its true colors premat u r e l y , the already p. 6
close r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n Sukarno and the C o m m u n i s t Party is b o u n d to be fu r t h e r intensified. Inasmuch as Suka r n o is either b l ind to or a c q u i e s c e n t w i t h C ommunist s t r a t e g y in Indonesia, the e v e n t u a l u p s h o t of this a l liance can be sa f e l y predicted. Here is i ndeed a m a n f o o l i s h l y seeking to ride the bac k of a tiger and b o u n d to end up inside.
8.
The b e l i e f that, as a last resort, S u k arno and the I n d o n e s i a n A r m y in league w o u l d c r u s h any m o v e to e s t a b l i s h C o m m u n i s t a s c e n d a n c y is b a s e d u p o n a n u m b e r of e rroneous p r e m ises.
Th e C o m m u n i s t m o v e m e n t in I ndonesia no longer seeks a direct c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h the forces op p o s i n g it but has e m b a rked u p o n a s u c c e s s f u l p o l i c y of legal accession.
The I n d o n e sian Army, on the o t h er hand, by the a d m i s s i o n of its C h ief of Staff, G e n e r a l Nasu t i on, has likewise a b a n d o n e d all thought of c r u s h i n g the C o m m u n i s t m o v e m e n t by force.
This r e n u n c i a t i o n has b een v a r i o u s l y i n t e r p r e t e d as an act of f a r s i g h t e d s t a t e s m a n s h i p on N a s u t i o n 's p a r t (implying the e x i s t e n c e of a long range m a s ter p l a n for d e a l i n g w i t h the Comm u n i s t threat), as a r e c o g n i tion of the army's i nab i l i t y to c o nfront the PKI w i t h o u t c o n f ronting Sukarno, or as a b y -p r o d u c t of the Wes t Irian crisis. The p o s s i b i l i t y that the army m a y no longer be in full control of its own d e s t i n y be cause of serious C o m m u n i s t p e n e t r a t i o n s into the ranks of its officers' and n o n -c o m m i s s i o n e d officers' p. 7 corps, though plausible has been relegated since we lack suffi ciently hard intelligence to substantiate it.
9.
Our polic i e s , in order to be realistic, should be p r e d i cated u p o n the a s s u m p t i o n of an u n t r a m m e l e d c o n t i n u a t i o n of C o m m u n i s t g r o w t h as long as P r e s i d e n t Sukarno is at the helm. Such growth, h owever, c a n not co n t i n u e i n d e f i n i t e l y w i t h o u t leading to a C o m m u n i s t t a k e o v e r --m o s t likely by con s t i t u t i o n a l , less likely b y r e v o l u t i o n a r y means. [is] e x e r t i n g on [the] P r e s i d e n t ' s t h o u g h t s . "
He found P r e s i dent S u k a r n o " p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h d e f i n i n g I n d o n e s i a n socialism" and as a p p e a r i n g to "have in m i n d some form of n a t i o n a l c o m m u n ism."
He felt that S u karno's "recent trip to the U n i t e d N a tions Ge n e r a l A s s e m b l y appears to have s t r e n g t h e n e d In p u r s u i n g the c ourse he has m a p p e d for his c o u n t r y ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y (what ever m a y be its c a u s e ) , P r e s i d e n t S u k a r n o wil l be found n e i t h e r a p p e a s a b l e no r s u s c e p t i b l e to m o r e ta n g i b l e inducements. C o u n t e r v a i l i n g Forces?
1. The I n d o n e s i a n Chief of Staff, General Nasution, is f r e q u e n t l y m e n t i o n e d as a m i l i t a r y s t r o ngman who will step into the b r e a c h once S u k a r n o 's p o l icies have led I n d o nesia to the br i n k of d isaster. N a s u t i o n h i m s e l f has spared no effort to dispel the n o t i o n that he wishes to become I n d o n e s i a fs m an of d e s t i n y and c h a l l e n g e P r e s ident Sukarno in that role.
Yet, in the face of a c o n s i s t e n t re c o r d of y i e l d i n g to Sukarno on s e v eral m a j o r counts, those fo r e i g n o b servers w h o pin their hopes on hi m p e r s i s t in their c o n v i c t i o n that N a s u t i o n is following a set strategy, a l l o w i n g for maj o r tactical deviations.
We cannot share this estimate.
The S u k a r n o / N a s u t i o n axis appears quite durable.
We f u r ther beli e v e that a b l o o d l e s s Sukarno v i c t o r y over the D u t c h in West Irian w o u l d mak e a p r o f o u n d impressio n u p o n the I n d o n e s i a n High Command, c o n f r o n t i n g its more c o n s e r v a tive and b a s i c a l l y a n t i -S u k a r n o elements w i t h the same d i lem ma w h i c h led to the col lapse of the r e s i s t a n c e m o v e m e n t w i t h i n the G e r m a n G eneral Staff after H i t l e r ac q u i r e d the S u d e t e n l a n d withp. 2 out firing a shot. In sum, we cannot v i s u a l i z e General Na s u t i o n as g e n e r a t i n g any vital impulses toward a saner f o reign policy, at least not as long as the West Irian issue is in suspense. We are fu r t h e r p r e p a r e d to take N a s u t i o n 1s w o r d for it that he does not seek a c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h the Co m m u n i s t Party of I n d o nesia.
We are a w a i t ing more c o n c l u s i v e dat a b e f o r e associ a t i n g o u r selves f ully w i t h Pr o f e s s o r Guy P a u k e r 's thesis that the M o s c o w talks m a y have forced G e neral N a s u t i o n into a de facto a l l iance w i t h the C o m m unist Party.
Af t e r all, N a s u t i o n has p e r mitted, and at times indeed encour a g e d , a n t i -C o m m u n i s t actions l a u nched by his s u b o r d i n a t e commands.
Thus far he has not gone down the line w i t h the C ommunists, and, w i t h i n P r e sident S u k a r n o 's off i c i a l family, he r e p r e s e n t s one of the few r e m aining voic e s of reason.
We are hence at this stage d i s i n c l i n e d to wr i t e him off e n t i r e l y as an "asset" in the effort to contain the C o m m u n i s t M o v e m e n t in Indonesia.
2.
The d i s s i d e n t movement, as an e f f e c t i v e c o u n t e r v a i l i n g force to S u k a r n o 's policies, will p r o b a b l y have to be counted out.
Rec e n t d e v e l o p m e n t s lend subs t a n c e to the claims of the I n d o n e s i a n A r m y that it has the d i s s i d e n t s on the run.
A.
S u m a t r a (1) The d i s s i d e n t forces in Su m a t r a total about 7,000 ar m e d m e n and are l ocated in Atjeh, Ta p a n u l i and C e n tral Sumatra. The st r o n g e s t of these elements, the p. 3 5 , 0 0 0 -m a n "Banteng D i v i s i o n " in Central Sumatra, a l t h o u g h it exerts w i d e s p r e a d control over rural areas and r e p r e s e n t s the best o r g a n i z e d and most u n i f i e d of the d i s s i d e n t commands, has r e c e n t l y had defections of two key o f f icers and "several hu n d r e d " troops.
(2) Troops in Tapanuli, n o w n u m b e r i n g 1 , 0 0 0 -2,000 a rmed men, have bee n h a r r a s s e d [sic] and scattered by si d e r a t i o n . " At this meeting, A m b a s s a d o r Jones p r e s e n t e d to Sukarno a letter fro m P resident E i s e n h o w e r e x p r e s s i n g a personal interest in the Pope case.
In J a n u a r y 1961 U.S. Air Force Genp. 3 eral W h i t e e x p r e s s e d to I n d o nesian A i r Force C h i e f of Staff S u r y a d a r m a the hop e that the I n d o nesian G o v e r n m e n t m ight see fit to e x t e n d l e n i e n cy to Pope as a gest u r e of good will toward the U n i t e d States.
Mrs. Pope has r e c e n t l y r e t u r n e d from I n d o n e sia and has w r i t t e n to Pres i d e n t Kenn e d y r e q u e s t i n g his i n t e r ce s s i o n on her h u s b a n d ' s behalf.
She plans to r e t u r n to I n d o n e sia to be p r e s e n t w h e n the S u p reme Court d e c i s i o n is hand e d down.
5.
D e s p i t e c e r t a i n d e b a t a b l e aspects of the I n d onesian legal p r o c e e d i n g s , it is u n d o u b t e d l y true that Pope was g u ilty of the m a j o r c harges on w h i c h he was convicted.
It is quite apparent, h owever, that the final d i s p o s i t i o n of the case will be d e t e r m i n e d on p o l i t i c a l rather than p u r e l y legal grounds. The e x p e c t e d t i ming of the S u p reme Court's a n n o u n c e m e n t of its d e c i s i o n sug g e s t s a c o n n e c t i o n w i t h the f o r t h c o m i n g m e e t i n g b e tween P r e s i d e n t K e n n e d y and Pres i d e n t Sukarno. * * * 6. In m y o p i n i o n Pope's cond u c t b o t h be f o r e and after his c apture entitles h i m to our g r a t i t u d e and any a p p r o p r i a t e action to m i t i g a t e his sentence.
